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Issue: February, 1998
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History Corner |
by Steve Hassna
LISTEN UP, TROOPS!
It's the old Drill Sgt. here, and guess what? It's Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, a time to celebrate and rejoice. An expression of a people's culture thousands of years old. Tet starts at the end of January each year with festive celebrations, families coming together and getting ready for the upcoming year. The same as the rest of us on this dirt ball we call earth. Now, Americans have a whole different hit on this holiday. The first time we (Americans) really got a chance to experience Tet, was in 1968. That Tet was quite different then those of say oh, the last thousand years!
Hey, this is a history column, so let's check some history. We're going back to Tet 1968, or as I like to call it, "the straw that broke the camel's back". I called Mr. Peabody, asked him if he could warm up the Way Back machine, and we could take a little trip. "Tet 68?, No way Jose," was his reply. "Me and Sherman are going to take in a matinee, see something quiet like "The Wild Bunch" or a Mel Gibson "Road Warrior" flick. But if you want to use the Way Back, feel free. The instructions are easy enough, even an ex-Drill Sgt. can understand them. I still went over them verbally with Mr. Peabody. Hey, I know what I'm doing, I was just checking. Drill Sgts. know what they're doing and can read. You didn't know that? Well, they can.
Like any historical period, a little pre-event background helps to get things in perspective. So let's start from about, oh, December, 1967, South Vietnam. I had been in country since March 21st, nine months, and was feeling short. If you don't understand the term "short" then you got it, go find a Nam vet and ask him. Man or woman, the term is relative.
As a member of C. company 2nd 327th Airborne Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, my M.O.S. was 11B4P, which is Infantry Paratrooper. The job description with that monniker goes as follows: A rifleman, 2nd squad member of the 4th platoon, also pointman, tunnel rat, participation in on-going search and destroy missions, chasing the North Vietnamese Army around a lot, and last but not least, staying alive.
December 1967 brought the U.S. towards the end of another year of on going combat in the Nam. December was also the time for General William C. Westmoreland to continue the charade of mis-information. M.A.C.V. (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) knew something was up. Intelligence reports of build-ups (V.C. & N.V.A.) everywhere. But why listen to intel. reports when you can just make things up. Westmoreland told Pres. Johnson and everyone else that the Vietnamese opposition couldn't launch an effective offensive. At the same time, U.S. Army and Marine units along the Vietnam-Cambodian and Laotian borders were receiving enough pressure from the above V.C. & N.V.A., to cause an extreme pucker factor among those troops. "Pucker Factor"; ask a Vet. Someone said something about "light at the end of the tunnel". In fact, this was true; it was a train with the V.C. & N.V.A. on board and getting ready to roll right into the American forces. The train with the bright light would arrive at the station on Jan. 31st, 1968.(Tet)
The first brigade, 101st Airborne had moved from operations in Phan Thiet to the small town of Song Be. Song Be is a very short distance east from the Cambodian boarder, northwest of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), and in harm's way. The 1st Bde. 101st Airborne had been all over the country that year, and me with them since March. We were Westmoreland's personal envoys in the countryside. We had been from Khan Dong, to Duc Pho, to Chu Lai, to Bo Loc, to Phan Thiet, and now, within miles of Cambodia, Song Be. And which way did the astute leaders of MACV, Westmoreland and commanding officer of the 1st bde., 101st Airborne look? West, straight at Cambodia. Oh, this is not a surprise to you? Well it was to me and a whole bunch of paratroopers of the 2nd 327th, 1st 327th, and 2nd 502nd Airborne Infantry. Yes, 3 battallions of infantry at about 600 combat troops per battalion. Just wanted you to know the confusion wasn't all mine. I guess confusion isn't the right word; how about, "It don't mean nothing", which translates to, "We don't know where the hell we are; we have been all over this country; it don't matter, if we are here, it's trouble". At the same time, troops of the 25th Infantry, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 9th Infantry, 173rd Airborne, 1st Calvary, 11th Armored Cav. and marine combat units, were being moved around to get ready for something, Westmoreland said the Vietnamese couldn't do. Oh well, I guess it's nice to live in denile (not the river).
At the same time, V.C. and N.V.A. were readying their troops for the upcoming melee. They'd been planning since the last Tet celebrations. General Giap was not someone to run into things without planning. This is the guy who planned the Viet Minh attack on the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, also the siege of the marine base at Khe Sanh in 1967-68. A lot of pucker factor there. This valley resembled Dien Bien Phu to the point that Giap must have chuckled a bit when he looked at the maps. Let's see, marines in the valley floor, N.V.A. in the mountains looking down on them, yeah, we can do that! The marines were on record against the idea of Khe Sanh as a base. But Westmoreland said his crystal ball said, "don't worry, be happy".
From late December 1967 and into January '68, the 1st Bde 101st Airborn operated west of Song Be. How do I know we went West, when I didn't know where we were to begin with? Well, if you walk into the setting sun in Vietnam, you are going west. Now this did not dawn on me or others I was with at the time. We were on operation, that's all. It was years later that it became clear to me and others after we compared notes: that we were in Cambodia. There were some points of observation:
My company, alone, found a road for trucks hidden so it couldn't be seen from the air, a phone cable with 26 phone lines in it, and a base camp for new N.V.A. troops coming down from the North (90th replacement Battallion, Ho Chi Minh style). This was going on all along the border region.
Mid January, 68' The V.C. & N.V. A. started the engine of the train, turned on the light and started to roll. Over the next two weeks, V.C. & N.V.A. troops infiltrated to positions near their targets. On January 31st, at about 5:00 a.m., the train hit the station. The V.C. & N.V. A. hit every military base, strategic hamlet and large urban areas in the country at the same time. This was a Vietnamese version of the "wake up call". And the alarm bell was heard all the way to Washing DC. Where was I? Why, out on that dirt road, with a bunch of other guys, looking the wrong way. 80,000 V.C. & N.V. A. troops were forming a mosh pit and U. S. troops were invited to party with them.
Hue was hit, Quang Tri hit, Song Be hit, Saigon hit, with the U.S. Embassy attacked and stormed. Tan Son Nhut airbase attacked and under siege. The scenario was the same all over South Vietnam. The memories of Custer began to take on new meaning. Feb. 1st, and my unit was picked up and sent to Tan Son Nhut airbase to help the defenders. Units from the 9th Inf. Div. 1st Inf. Div. and 25th Inf. Div. cut off from their base camps and forced to man the wire at Tan Son Nhut; not a good picture. At that time, a platoon from the 2nd Bde. (the 2nd & 3rd Bdes. of the 101st came over from the states in Nov. 67, the 1st Bde. had been there since 1965) were airlifted to the roof of the U.S. Embassy; with orders to clear the building of enemy soldiers. Prisoners? What prisoners? Here's a point to show a good example of dis-information . For years after the Tet, the official word was that the embassy was taken back by troops on the ground and that the V.C. didn't get past the second floor. Troops of the 101st knew of the asault on the embassy roof. Why not admit that? Well, that would mean the situation was worse than Westmoreland and crew wanted to acknowledged. I have a 101st Airborne yearbook for 1968, yeah, yearbook, just like high school, only with a different twist! It has pictures showing troops landing on the roof of the embassy and a description of what went on. Secure floor by floor.
All through February '68, pitched battles raged across So. Vietnam. The marines were locked into one mother of a battle in I corps. Hue became a place you did not want to be. 2500 N.V.A. troops in the Citadel of the imperial city. Block by block, doorway by doorway, the Marines and N.V.A. sent each other to their respective gods.
My company was moved from Tan Son Nhut when it calmed down; sent to guard an oil dump on the Saigon river. Not a shot fired near that oil dump, the whole time we were there, while the Cholon District was leveled. You following me here? Oil important, people not important. Mid February, and we were moved to a Marine base at Phu Bai, I had about 30 days left in country, and guess what Phu Bai is near? Why Hue, where else? That city you don't want to be in. The Marines said, no lines, no waiting, don't even have to take a number. Plenty of death and misery to go around. I got malaria for the second time in Phu Bai and was put in the hospital where my pucker factor almost went to Defcon 4; incapacitated, with no weapons at hand.
Into March and things started to calm down. Well, I guess calm was a relative term. Meaning, where you were, and how much live ammo both sides had to throw at each other. Back from the hospital in the rear and getting ready to go home. March 21st, and I got on a plane and returned stateside. Things were calming down. That same day, my company was attacked in the A Shau Valley, pretty well stomped. My friend, Billy C. Bryles was seriously wounded, many more killed. Billy C. and I still see each other and just shake our heads about Tet '68.
The V.C. and N.V.A. got their share of stomp too. Whole units were destroyed and key personnel lost. Things were not looking real good from their side either. The one thing that no one thought about was the psychological effect on the American people and U.S. troops. Hence, the camel's back. Excuse me, Westmoreland, but you said they couldn't do that. America got a real reality check from Tet. The only thing Westmoreland said was, "We were able to take back the areas we lost". Which means, from his mind set, we won. This is like saying the Titanic had a mishap, but at least it hit the floor of the ocean.
The Tet, if nothing else, proved that the Vietnamese were not going to quit until it was over, completely over. If the Americans wanted to hang around, then that's the way it would be. And the battles raged on through '68, '69, '70 & '71. You get the picture. From Tet on, all we did was take casualities; while at home, the country tore itself apart.
It's times like this, that history weighs heavy on me. And now it continues: let's have a stand-off in Iraq, maybe burn up some more old ordinance and keep the world's militarism on an even keel. You noticed I said world, because that's what it is. World militarism, just take a look around. Wars don't end, they just move around alot. Better check out Chiapas, in southern Mexico. That area has a lot of potential to become a real mess. And it's so close to home; less distance to send arms and equipment to the Mexican army . We have been involved with Mexico for so long, what's one more time in the whole scheme of things?
Well troops, that's it for now. Remember, keep reading those newspapers and watching the news for the next contradiction of what we all know and love as the American historical process.
And today's tips are:
Drill Sgt. Hassna Out
copyright Steve Hassna, 1998
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